By Mahmud Tim Kargbo
One of the most significant reforms proposed in the Constitution of Sierra Leone (Amendment) Bill, 2025 concerns the manner in which Members of Parliament are elected. Although the proposed amendment appears relatively brief, its constitutional implications are profound. Electoral systems determine not only how votes are counted, but also how political power is distributed, how citizens are represented, and ultimately how governments derive their democratic legitimacy.
The Bill proposes that Members of Parliament be elected through a system of proportional representation, with the detailed method of implementation left to future legislation enacted by Parliament. This proposal marks a substantial departure from Sierra Leone’s long established constituency based electoral tradition, and therefore deserves careful constitutional scrutiny.
Electoral systems are not simply technical mechanisms. They shape the relationship between citizens and their representatives, influence party behaviour, affect political stability and determine whether Parliament reflects both national diversity and local accountability.
No electoral system is inherently superior in every constitutional setting. What succeeds in one country may perform poorly in another. The constitutional question is therefore not whether proportional representation is a recognised democratic model, but whether Sierra Leone’s political history, institutional development and democratic culture are presently suited to its adoption.
Proportional representation offers several recognised democratic advantages.
It generally produces legislatures that more accurately reflect the percentage of votes received by political parties. Smaller political parties are less likely to be excluded from Parliament, and the diversity of political opinion within society is more likely to be represented in national decision making.
Such systems can encourage broader political participation by reducing the number of votes that are effectively “wasted” under winner takes all electoral arrangements. They may also promote coalition building, compromise and inclusive governance, particularly within politically diverse societies.
In countries with strong political institutions, mature party systems and well established democratic traditions, proportional representation has often contributed to inclusive governance and greater representation of minority interests.
However, constitutional design must always reflect national realities rather than theoretical ideals.
Sierra Leone’s political landscape has historically been characterised by strong regional voting patterns, highly personalised political competition and intense rivalry between major political parties. Elections have often generated significant political tension, not simply because of electoral rules, but because electoral outcomes carry profound implications for access to political and economic power.
Within such an environment, constitutional reform should proceed cautiously.
One of the principal strengths of Sierra Leone’s traditional constituency based system has been the direct relationship between Members of Parliament and the communities they represent.
Citizens know their elected representative.
Members of Parliament know the communities they serve.
Voters can directly reward or remove their representative through subsequent elections.
This relationship creates an important mechanism of democratic accountability.
A Member of Parliament is expected to maintain regular contact with constituents, advocate local development priorities and remain politically answerable to identifiable communities.
Proportional representation based upon closed party lists risks weakening this important constitutional relationship.
Where party leadership determines candidate rankings on electoral lists, accountability may gradually shift away from citizens towards political party executives.
Members of Parliament may become more dependent upon maintaining favour with party leadership than upon serving the interests of local communities.
Such a development could unintentionally reduce parliamentary independence while strengthening internal party control.
This concern becomes particularly significant where political parties themselves have not yet developed strong internal democratic structures.
Internal party democracy remains an essential prerequisite for successful proportional representation.
Candidate selection procedures should be transparent, competitive and democratic.
Party members should have meaningful opportunities to participate in determining candidate rankings.
Without such safeguards, proportional representation may simply transfer democratic deficits from the national electoral process into internal party structures.
The Amendment Bill also leaves the detailed operation of proportional representation to future legislation.
This raises an important constitutional concern.
Fundamental features of the electoral system should not depend entirely upon ordinary legislation.
Constitutional principles governing democratic representation should themselves be constitutionally protected.
The Constitution should therefore clearly specify essential elements of the electoral model, including:
the type of proportional representation to be adopted;
whether lists will be open or closed;
the method of allocating parliamentary seats;
the electoral threshold required for parliamentary representation;
mechanisms for independent candidates;
procedures governing replacement of vacant parliamentary seats.
Leaving these matters entirely to Parliament allows future governments to alter fundamental electoral rules through ordinary legislation, potentially creating uncertainty and political controversy before elections.
Another constitutional concern relates to independent candidates.
The Bill permits independent presidential candidates but provides comparatively little guidance regarding independent participation in parliamentary elections under proportional representation.
This creates uncertainty.
If parliamentary elections are conducted solely through party lists, opportunities for independent candidates may become significantly restricted.
Independent candidates have historically contributed to democratic competition and should not be unintentionally excluded through electoral system design.
Constitutional reform should therefore explicitly protect opportunities for independent participation where appropriate.
The relationship between proportional representation and constituency representation also deserves careful consideration.
Many democracies have adopted mixed electoral systems combining both constituency representation and proportional allocation of seats.
Germany, New Zealand and several other constitutional democracies have successfully implemented mixed member systems that preserve local accountability while improving proportional fairness.
Such an approach may offer valuable lessons for Sierra Leone.
Rather than replacing constituency representation entirely, a mixed electoral model could preserve direct links between Members of Parliament and their constituencies while introducing proportional elements that better reflect national voting patterns.
This would combine the strengths of both systems while minimising their respective weaknesses.
Public understanding also remains essential.
Electoral reform cannot succeed if voters themselves do not fully understand how the new system operates.
The Constitution should therefore require extensive civic education before implementation of any new electoral system.
Citizens should understand how votes translate into parliamentary seats, how candidates are selected, how representation operates and how elected representatives remain accountable.
Confidence in elections depends not only upon fairness but also upon public understanding.
The proposed constitutional amendments should therefore require the National Electoral Commission to conduct comprehensive nationwide voter education before the first election conducted under any revised electoral system.
Finally, constitutional reform should recognise that electoral systems alone cannot solve broader political challenges.
Good governance depends equally upon political leadership, institutional integrity, judicial independence, effective parliamentary oversight and respect for constitutional norms.
Changing the electoral formula without strengthening democratic institutions more broadly may not produce the desired improvements in governance.
Sierra Leone’s constitutional future should therefore be guided not by international trends alone but by careful assessment of national experience, democratic maturity and institutional capacity.
Electoral reform should strengthen representation without weakening accountability.
It should encourage political inclusion without diminishing the direct relationship between citizens and their elected representatives.
Above all, constitutional reform should preserve public confidence that Parliament remains both representative of the nation and accountable to the people.
End of PART THREE