By Mahmud Tim Kargbo
The office of President occupies a unique position within Sierra Leone’s constitutional order. The President is both Head of State and Head of Government, exercises extensive executive authority, commands the Armed Forces, appoints numerous constitutional office holders and plays a central role in shaping national policy. Given the breadth of these powers, the method by which a President is elected is not merely an electoral issue. It is a constitutional question that goes to the heart of democratic legitimacy.
Among the most significant proposals contained in the Constitution of Sierra Leone (Amendment) Bill, 2025 is the amendment to Section 42 governing the election of the President. The Bill proposes replacing the constitutional requirement that a successful presidential candidate secure at least fifty-five percent of the valid votes cast nationwide, with a requirement that a candidate obtain a simple majority of valid votes together with at least twenty percent of the votes cast in no fewer than two thirds of the districts.
This proposal represents a fundamental change in the constitutional basis upon which presidential legitimacy is established. It therefore deserves careful legal, political and constitutional examination.
The method by which a President is elected determines the degree of democratic authority with which the office is exercised. A President who assumes office with broad national support is generally better positioned to govern inclusively, command public confidence and unite citizens across political, regional and ethnic divisions. Conversely, where the electoral threshold is perceived as too low, questions may arise regarding whether the President truly represents the majority of the electorate.
The existing constitutional framework sought to ensure that the President would enjoy a substantial measure of nationwide support before assuming office. By requiring an absolute majority beyond a simple plurality, the Constitution encouraged candidates to appeal to voters across regional, political and ethnic lines rather than relying solely upon traditional electoral strongholds.
The proposed amendment lowers that national threshold while introducing a geographical distribution requirement. Supporters of the amendment may argue that the new system simplifies the electoral process, reduces the cost of conducting second round elections and allows governments to be formed more quickly after national polls.
These objectives are understandable.
Run-off elections require considerable financial resources, place additional demands upon election administrators and may prolong periods of political uncertainty. Avoiding unnecessary second elections may therefore produce administrative and financial benefits.
Nevertheless, constitutional convenience should never outweigh democratic legitimacy.
The principal constitutional concern arising from the proposed amendment is whether a simple plurality provides sufficient democratic authority for an office vested with such extensive constitutional powers.
In a multi-party election involving several candidates, it is entirely possible for a candidate to secure the Presidency while receiving significantly less than half of the votes cast. Under such circumstances, a majority of voters may have supported other candidates.
Although the geographical requirement of obtaining at least twenty percent of the votes in two thirds of the districts encourages broader national appeal, it does not necessarily ensure that the successful candidate commands majority support nationwide.
The Constitution should seek not merely to produce a winner, but to ensure that the winner possesses a democratic mandate that is widely accepted by the electorate.
This issue assumes particular importance within Sierra Leone’s political environment.
The country’s electoral history has often reflected strong regional voting patterns and intense political competition between the principal political parties. Presidential elections frequently generate heightened political tension, because the office carries extensive executive authority and significant influence over national governance.
Within such a context, constitutional arrangements should encourage broad national consensus rather than narrow electoral victories.
An electoral system that permits a President to assume office with a relatively modest share of the popular vote may inadvertently deepen political polarisation if substantial sections of the electorate perceive that they are governed by a President who lacks majority support.
For this reason, many constitutional democracies require either an absolute majority of votes or a second round election between the leading candidates, where no candidate achieves the prescribed threshold.
Run-off elections serve an important constitutional purpose.
They require the leading candidates to broaden their appeal beyond their traditional support bases. Candidates are encouraged to negotiate, build alliances, moderate political positions and seek support from voters who initially supported other parties.
The second round therefore promotes coalition building, political moderation and wider national legitimacy.
It is sometimes argued that run-off elections are expensive.
While this is undoubtedly true, constitutional democracy should not be measured solely by financial cost.
The legitimacy conferred by a broadly supported President may prove far less costly than prolonged political instability arising from disputed electoral outcomes or questions regarding democratic authority.
The Bill also introduces detailed procedures governing petitions where the Chief Electoral Commissioner determines that no candidate has been duly elected in the first round. These provisions establish timelines for judicial review, notification by the Chief Justice and the conduct of run-off elections where required.
The inclusion of clearer constitutional timelines is welcome.
Electoral disputes should be resolved promptly in order to avoid prolonged uncertainty and preserve public confidence in constitutional governance.
However, the proposed timelines appear particularly compressed.
Requiring constitutional petitions to be filed within three days may place significant practical burdens upon candidates seeking to gather evidence from across the country. Likewise, requiring the Supreme Court to determine complex electoral disputes within fourteen days may prove challenging in cases involving extensive factual and legal issues.
Constitutional certainty is important, but so too is procedural fairness.
The Constitution should ensure that sufficient time exists for parties to prepare petitions, present evidence and receive reasoned judicial determinations without unnecessarily delaying the transition process.
Another noteworthy proposal concerns the suspension of criminal proceedings against presidential candidates during the year preceding elections where the State is a party to the proceedings.
The apparent objective is to prevent politically motivated prosecutions from being used to influence electoral competition.
While protecting electoral fairness is a legitimate constitutional objective, the proposed wording requires careful refinement.
An automatic suspension of criminal proceedings may unintentionally undermine the constitutional principle that all persons are equal before the law.
Rather than imposing a blanket suspension, consideration should be given to allowing the courts to determine whether criminal proceedings genuinely threaten electoral fairness or constitute an abuse of prosecutorial powers.
Judicial oversight would better balance electoral integrity with the rule of law.
The proposed amendments also clarify when a President elect assumes office following elections or the determination of election petitions.
Greater constitutional certainty regarding presidential succession is desirable because ambiguity during transfers of power can create institutional instability.
Similarly, the proposed restrictions upon the powers of an outgoing President during the transition period complement these provisions by reducing opportunities for abuse of executive authority before the incoming administration assumes office.
Taken together, these reforms strengthen constitutional continuity during periods of political transition.
However, further clarification would improve legal certainty.
The Constitution should define more precisely the circumstances under which a fresh presidential election becomes necessary following judicial intervention.
It should also provide comprehensive guidance regarding the legal status of executive decisions taken during disputed election periods, and clarify the constitutional authority exercised by incumbent office holders while petitions remain pending.
Finally, constitutional reform should recognise that presidential elections are not simply mechanisms for selecting a national leader.
They are opportunities through which the people collectively renew the democratic legitimacy of the State itself.
Electoral rules should therefore inspire confidence across political divides, encourage broad national participation and produce outcomes that are accepted not merely because they comply with legal procedures, but because they command democratic respect.
Sierra Leone’s constitutional framework has long sought to balance efficiency with legitimacy.
Any amendment affecting the election of the President should preserve that balance.
The office of President derives its constitutional authority from the confidence of the people. Electoral rules should therefore ensure that every President assumes office with a mandate that reflects not merely legal victory, but genuine national endorsement.
Carefully reconsidering the proposed electoral threshold would strengthen public confidence in presidential elections, reinforce democratic legitimacy and promote national unity. Constitutional reform should always aspire to produce institutions that are not only lawful, but also widely accepted as fair, inclusive and representative of the sovereign will of the people.
End of PART FOUR