Legal consultant and human rights officer, Samuel Alfred Olivant, has questioned the legal and procedural basis for the committal of former Attorney-General and Minister of Justice, Joseph Fitzgerald Kamara (JFK), to Pademba Road Prison, arguing that the exercise of the Supreme Court’s contempt powers must be guided by constitutional safeguards, judicial impartiality and the principles of a fair hearing.
In a legal commentary titled “Contempt, Courage and the Constitution: The JFK–Chief Justice Controversy and the Limits of the Summary Power,” published on 11 October 2026, Olivant said the matter raised fundamental questions about the relationship between judicial authority, the independence of the Bar and the protection of individual liberty under Sierra Leone’s Constitution.
He maintained that although courts must be protected from conduct that undermines the administration of justice, their authority must be exercised within the confines of the law.
“Judicial authority is not judicial infallibility; fearless advocacy is not, without more, contempt of court; and criticism of judicial conduct, however unwelcome, must not automatically be equated with an attack on the administration of justice,” Olivant stated.
He emphasised that no lawyer should be considered above the law, but cautioned that the power to deprive an individual of liberty through contempt proceedings, particularly summary committal, must be exercised with strict regard for due process, proportionality and the right to a fair hearing.
Olivant’s commentary follows the reported confrontation between Kamara and Chief Justice Komba Kamanda during the Supreme Court’s hearing of a constitutional challenge involving the Constitution of Sierra Leone (Amendment) Bill.
According to press reports cited in the commentary, Kamara, who reportedly appeared as lead counsel in the matter, raised concerns about the filing of the Attorney-General’s Statement of Case. During the exchange, he allegedly told the Chief Justice that he was “showing his hand too early.”
The Chief Justice reportedly responded that the court was not a political theatre, prompting a further exchange in which Kamara maintained that he was citing the law and seeking permission to present his case.
The substantive hearing subsequently continued.
Olivant noted that the following day, the Chief Justice reportedly raised the matter in court and demanded that Kamara apologise and retract his remarks. Although Kamara reportedly apologised, the Chief Justice considered the apology insufficiently sincere and ordered his committal to Pademba Road Prison.
However, Olivant cautioned that the official record of the proceedings had not been published at the time of his writing and that press accounts differed on certain material details. He therefore urged that any definitive assessment of the legality of the committal should be based on the formal court order, the full transcript and the legal grounds relied upon by the court.
Central to his argument is Section 17 of the 1991 Constitution, which recognises contempt of court as a lawful ground for deprivation of liberty, subject to the requirements of the law. He also cited Section 23, which provides constitutional protections relating to fair hearings, the presumption of innocence and the rights of persons charged with criminal offences.
According to Olivant, the constitutional recognition of contempt proceedings does not exempt them from established procedural safeguards.
He relied on the Court of Appeal’s decision in re Manni and the Supreme Court’s subsequent position in Isatu Kamara v Attorney-General, arguing that where committal for criminal contempt amounts to a conviction, the constitutional guarantees governing criminal proceedings must be taken seriously.
The legal consultant also cited Johnson v R, in which the Court of Appeal established that a person facing summary committal must be informed of the substance of the charge and given an opportunity to explain why the order should not be made.
Olivant argued that these requirements raised important questions about whether Kamara was informed of the precise conduct alleged to constitute contempt and whether he was given a meaningful opportunity to respond to a clearly formulated charge before being deprived of his liberty.
He further questioned whether immediate committal was necessary, particularly given that the Supreme Court had reportedly allowed the substantive constitutional hearing to continue following the initial confrontation.
In his assessment, the circumstances called for careful consideration of whether the alleged conduct genuinely obstructed the administration of justice or primarily involved criticism of the presiding judge.
Drawing on common-law authorities, including Ambard v Attorney-General for Trinidad and Tobago and R v Metropolitan Police Commissioner, ex parte Blackburn (No 2), Olivant argued that contempt jurisdiction should protect the administration of justice rather than serve merely to defend the personal dignity of a judicial officer.
He nevertheless acknowledged that Kamara’s reported remark was ill-judged and could reasonably have been regarded as an inappropriate way to raise concerns about possible prejudgment.
Olivant said allegations of apparent bias should ordinarily be raised through formal legal applications supported by specific grounds and expressed in measured language.
He maintained, however, that a judicial rebuke and imprisonment were fundamentally different responses, insisting that the seriousness of the punishment required careful consideration of the nature of the alleged contempt, the circumstances in which it occurred and the availability of less restrictive measures.
Another major issue highlighted in the commentary was the principle of judicial impartiality, particularly where the judge allegedly affected by the conduct is also responsible for determining whether contempt has occurred.
Olivant cited Kyprianou v Cyprus, a decision of the European Court of Human Rights, in which the court found a violation of the right to an impartial tribunal after judges who had become personally involved in a confrontation with a lawyer proceeded to convict and imprison him for contempt.
He also referred to decisions of the United States Supreme Court, including Offutt v United States and Mayberry v Pennsylvania, as comparative authorities supporting the principle that a judge who becomes personally embroiled in a dispute with counsel may need to leave the determination of contempt to another judicial officer.
Although acknowledging that these foreign decisions do not bind Sierra Leonean courts, Olivant argued that their reasoning was relevant to the constitutional guarantee of an impartial court.
He suggested that alternative approaches, including referral to a differently constituted judicial panel or the General Legal Council for possible professional disciplinary proceedings, could have been considered to protect the court’s authority while addressing concerns about impartiality.
The commentary also examined the significance of Kamara’s reported apologies and the proportionality of the custodial response.
Olivant noted that an apology does not automatically extinguish contempt, as a court may assess whether the expression of regret is genuine. However, he argued that where an advocate has apologised and withdrawn the offending remarks, the court should carefully evaluate whether imprisonment is necessary to restore order and protect the administration of justice.
He added that the circumstances would require a different assessment if Kamara had independently refused a lawful direction issued by the court. Such refusal, he observed, could itself constitute contempt, although the procedural requirements identified in Johnson v R would still be relevant.
Olivant further stressed that members of the legal profession have corresponding responsibilities to uphold the law, respect judicial proceedings and maintain professional standards.
Citing the United Nations Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, he said advocates must be able to discharge their professional duties without undue interference while ensuring that their conduct remains consistent with the recognised standards of the profession.
He urged lawyers to raise allegations of judicial bias through appropriate legal procedures and cautioned against conducting disputes arising from live proceedings through the media.
In conclusion, Olivant called for the controversy to be resolved through a transparent and legally grounded process, urging the Supreme Court to clarify the precise nature of the alleged contempt, provide a fair opportunity for Kamara to respond and consider whether the apologies already offered were sufficient.
He also called for any punishment deemed necessary to be proportionate to the conduct established and consistent with constitutional requirements.
According to Olivant, the controversy should not be reduced to a confrontation between an individual lawyer and the judiciary, but should instead serve as an opportunity to reaffirm the principles governing judicial accountability, professional independence and the rule of law.
“The dignity of the Bench must be preserved and the independence of the Bar protected, and both must remain subject to the Constitution,” he concluded.
He added that the strength of judicial authority ultimately rests not merely on the power to punish, but on the fairness, impartiality and restraint with which that power is exercised.
Samuel Alfred Olivant, Esq., holds an LLM and BL and identifies himself as a legal consultant, human rights officer and information security compliance expert