”Governance, Technocracy, Accountability, and the National Value of Competence”

By Mahmud Tim Kargbo

Mr Oswald Hanciles remains one of Sierra Leone’s most accomplished and historically consequential journalists. For decades, his writing, civic engagement, media interventions, and public commentary have shaped political conversation in Sierra Leone. His insistence on accountability, democratic scrutiny, and public debate has contributed meaningfully to national discourse across generations.

It is therefore in the spirit of democratic seriousness, rather than personal antagonism, that this response is offered. The central weakness in Mr Hanciles’ critique is not his insistence on accountability, which is entirely legitimate, but his insufficient distinction between imperfect governance and the alleged irrelevance of expertise itself. That distinction matters profoundly.

No serious democratic society evaluates public officials solely by credentials. Yet no serious state confronting institutional fragility can afford indifference toward competence either. This debate is therefore larger than Dr David Moinina Sengeh as an individual. It concerns the future relationship between expertise, governance, accountability, and democratic culture in Sierra Leone itself. At the centre of this discussion lies one unavoidable truth:

“A fragile democracy cannot modernise while simultaneously distrusting competence.” That principle should guide this conversation calmly, historically, and rationally.

Mr Hanciles correctly argues that academic brilliance alone does not automatically guarantee governmental success. History offers many examples of highly educated officials who failed politically or administratively. That caution is legitimate. But the opposite proposition is equally true. “No country has ever accelerated development through administrative incompetence.” Competence is not sufficient for national transformation. But incompetence has never accelerated development either. This is where the debate must become more intellectually precise.

No serious governance scholar argues that technocratic expertise automatically guarantees successful governance. The more serious argument is that technical competence increases the probability of institutional effectiveness when combined with functioning administrative systems, political discipline, and state capacity. That distinction matters enormously. Professor Samuel Huntington argued in “Political Order in Changing Societies” that institutional weakness, rather than ideology alone, constitutes one of the central crises confronting developing societies. Reference:

http://www.hup.harvard.edu/books/9780300011716

Francis Fukuyama similarly argues that state capacity, institutional competence, and administrative effectiveness remain foundational to successful modern governance. Reference:

http://www.farrarstraus.com/books/the-origins-of-political-order-by-francis-fukuyama/

Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson demonstrate in “Why Nations Fail” that institutional quality and capable governance structures significantly shape developmental outcomes. Reference:

http://www.whynationsfail.com

Dani Rodrik has likewise argued that successful development depends not merely upon ideology, but upon pragmatic institutional competence and adaptive governance systems. Reference:

http://drodrik.scholar.harvard.edu

These are not partisan political arguments. They are longstanding principles within modern governance scholarship. There is a profound difference between arguing that governance remains imperfect and arguing that expertise itself has little value in governance. That distinction should not be blurred.

Weak states are not destroyed only by corruption or political instability. They are also weakened by administrative mediocrity, institutional incoherence, poor technical execution, and the inability to translate policy into systems. Institutions do not collapse only through coups. Sometimes they decay through sustained mediocrity. Administrative weakness is not solved through anti-intellectual rhetoric.

This broader conversation also extends beyond Dr Sengeh personally. The more consequential national question is whether Sierra Leone benefits when highly trained professionals return home to contribute to public administration rather than permanently exporting their expertise abroad. That question carries enormous developmental significance. According to the African Development Bank, Africa continues to lose substantial numbers of highly educated professionals annually through sustained brain drain, producing serious institutional consequences across the continent. Reference:

http://www.afdb.org/en/documents/document/economic-brief-the-cost-of-brain-drain-in-africa-34911

The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa has similarly warned that long-term development in Africa depends significantly upon reversing the depletion of skilled human capital.Reference:

http://www.uneca.org

African states cannot simultaneously lament brain drain while trivialising highly educated Africans who choose to return home for public service. That contradiction deserves reflection.

Mr Hanciles correctly insists that symbolism cannot substitute for measurable outcomes. On that point, he is entirely right. Public officials should ultimately be assessed through evidence, outcomes, institutional performance, and measurable reforms. The empirical record surrounding Sierra Leone’s educational reforms is therefore important. According to the World Bank, Sierra Leone’s Free Quality School Education programme contributed to major increases in school enrolment after its launch in 2018, including hundreds of thousands of additional children entering formal education. Reference:

http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2020/01/29/free-quality-school-education-in-sierra-leone

UNICEF similarly documented expanded school participation, increased inclusion of girls, and broader educational access under the programme. Reference:

http://www.unicef.org/sierraleone/

Government education figures indicate that school enrolment reportedly increased from approximately 2 million learners before the implementation of the Free Quality School Education initiative to significantly higher levels afterwards, with strong increases in female participation and rural access. Reference:

http://www.mbsse.gov.sl. The Ministry of Basic and Senior Secondary Education also expanded digitised school census systems, Education Management Information Systems, and data-driven planning frameworks intended to improve educational administration and accountability. Reference:

http://www.mbsse.gov.sl/emis/. The “Education Innovation Challenge” promoted STEM engagement, robotics exposure, digital experimentation, and innovation-centred student participation across schools. Reference:

http://www.educationinnovationchallenge.com. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Sierra Leone implemented nationwide remote learning systems through radio teaching programmes, televised instruction, and emergency learning continuity mechanisms. UNESCO documented Sierra Leone among African states deploying remote educational continuity systems during school closures. Reference:

http://www.unesco.org/en/covid-19/educationresponse

As Chief Minister, Dr Sengeh has additionally overseen various digitisation and interoperability initiatives intended to improve coordination across ministries, departments, and agencies. Reference:

http://www.cm.gov.sl. These reforms may not constitute transformational perfection. But imperfect reform is not equivalent to absence of reform. That distinction matters. “No post-conflict African state transforms perfectly within a decade. The relevant question is whether institutions are stagnating, deteriorating, or gradually strengthening.”. State transformation in fragile democracies is evolutionary rather than cinematic. Institutional advancement is rarely linear. States often progress unevenly, reforming successfully in some sectors while stagnating in others.

Capacity-building is cumulative.

Administrative reform is generational.

Democratic consolidation unfolds unevenly across time. Persistent hardship does not automatically negate institutional reform, just as reform itself does not eliminate hardship overnight. Acknowledging structural constraints, post-war fragility, post-Ebola recovery burdens, COVID-era disruptions, and global inflationary pressures does not eliminate governmental responsibility. It simply prevents simplistic causal explanations. Democratic vigilance is essential. But democratic societies also weaken themselves when suspicion of expertise gradually becomes a substitute for governance analysis. That distinction is critical.

Criticism of government is legitimate. Criticism of policy implementation is legitimate. Criticism of economic hardship is legitimate. Criticism of inefficiency is legitimate. But criticism should not gradually evolve into cultural cynicism toward competence itself. African societies sometimes produce a troubling contradiction. We demand modernisation. We condemn corruption. We lament poor governance. We call for institutional efficiency. Yet simultaneously: we distrust experts, mock technocrats, politicise competence, and occasionally treat intellectual achievement itself with suspicion. That contradiction deserves reflection across the continent.

Post-conflict societies often develop understandable political fatigue, distrust toward leadership, pessimism toward institutions, and frustration with elites. Such sentiments are historically understandable after prolonged instability and economic hardship. Yet national cynicism can also unintentionally weaken long-term institutional confidence and reform culture. Public intellectuals therefore carry enormous responsibility.

Journalists, academics, politicians, technocrats, and commentators all shape national attitudes toward: education,  public service, governance, institutional trust, and democratic culture itself. That responsibility requires balance. A republic that persistently discourages competence eventually weakens its own developmental foundations. At the same time, technocratic governance cannot become insulated from democratic accountability. Both principles matter simultaneously.

This debate therefore transcends personalities. It is not fundamentally about whether one admires or opposes Dr David Moinina Sengeh. Nor should democratic discourse revolve around individual heroism or individual hostility. The larger issue is whether Sierra Leone wishes to cultivate a political culture capable of demanding competence without despising expertise, enforcing accountability without humiliating public service, and scrutinising public officials without discouraging national contribution itself. That balance defines mature democracies. “A fragile democracy cannot modernise while simultaneously distrusting competence.”That truth remains central throughout this entire debate.

A democratic republic must learn to scrutinise power without despising competence, demand accountability without humiliating public service, and cultivate intellectual seriousness without surrendering democratic vigilance. Sierra Leone’s future depends upon achieving that difficult balance.