WHY DOGE FAILED AND WHY SIERRA LEONE MUST LEARN FROM IT

By Mahmud Tim Kargbo

Cutting waste, fraud, and abuse in government spending is a noble aim, but the DOGE approach was doomed from the outset. It should serve as a cautionary tale for Sierra Leone, where similar experiments with technocratic reform, often driven by donor logic and external consultancy models, have repeatedly failed due to disregard for our Constitution, legal processes, institutional memory, and democratic accountability.

The Technocratic Mirage

DOGE, Elon Musk’s now defunct “Department of Government Efficiency”, promised to reduce government spending by two trillion dollars through mass layoffs and the use of engineering and AI based decision making. However, the initiative floundered because it fundamentally misunderstood the nature of governance. Musk and his team lacked experience in public administration, dismissed constitutional constraints, and treated democratic institutions as obstacles rather than as guardians of the public interest.

Sierra Leone has experienced its own versions of DOGE. From the era of Structural Adjustment to the post conflict New Public Management (NPM) reforms, we have consistently embraced the illusion that governance can be “fixed” through imported models, consultancy blueprints, or private sector logic. The results have included undermined institutions, weakened service delivery, inflated project costs, and reform fatigue among civil servants.

As the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) warned:

“Efforts at reforming the public service must be driven by local ownership, legal adherence, and historical consciousness. Reform, devoid of these, risks repeating the same cycles of exclusion, inefficiency and, ultimately, conflict.”

http://www.sierraleonetrc.org/index.php/view-report-text-vol-3b/item/volume-three-b-chapter-two

Governance by Spreadsheet: Why It Does Not Work

DOGE’s failure was not merely the result of poor decisions, but of ignorance masked as innovation. Musk’s team, composed largely of engineers and private sector specialists, operated with no understanding of civil service rules, administrative law, or the constitutional responsibilities of public institutions. Their core assumption was that if something works in a startup, it must work in government.

In Sierra Leone, we have observed a similar pattern. Young, foreign trained consultants armed with laptops and PowerPoint presentations have been granted reform mandates over sectors they scarcely understand. The Pay and Performance Project (PPP), backed by the World Bank, was intended to transform the civil service. Instead, it entrenched elite gate-keeping, paralysed recruitment, and prioritised data dashboards over lived experience.

Section 151(1)(a) of the 1991 Constitution mandates that appointments in the public service be based on merit and legal procedure. Yet, this provision has been repeatedly violated under the guise of reform. Political appointments are often rebranded as “technocratic”, simply because the appointees wear suits and speak English with polished accents.

A senior retired civil servant commented anonymously:

“They removed experienced directors and replaced them with donor funded consultants who didn’t understand cabinet memos. What followed was chaos.”

Local Examples of Technocratic Disaster

Free Quality Education School Feeding Contracts

Millions of Leones were allocated to outsourced feeding contractors with no local experience. The outcome included poor delivery, child malnutrition, and community protests. Accountability remains unclear.

COVID-19 Emergency Response Funds

Technocratic task forces sidelined local councils and traditional leaders. The Audit Service Sierra Leone (ASSL) 2020 Report found billions of Leones spent without receipts or procurement compliance.

http://www.auditservice.gov.sl

National Commission for Persons with Disability (NCPD)

The unconstitutional dismissal of Dr Vandy Konneh in 2025, replaced by a politically favoured appointee, contravened Section 4(1) of the Persons with Disability Act 2011 and Section 151(1) of the Constitution. The justification offered was “efficiency”. The reality was legal overreach and disruption of institutional independence.

Youth Commission Data Project

A multimillion dollar digital “youth dashboard” was built to track job creation, yet it remains unused. The application is offline. Trained staff have been transferred.

The Price of Skipping Process

Like DOGE, many Sierra Leone reformers treat constitutional procedures as bureaucratic red tape. Yet governance is not a tech start-up. It is a legal and democratic enterprise. The 1991 Constitution, particularly Sections 6(2) and 7, identifies the security and welfare of the people as the primary objectives of the state. Section 105 vests legislative authority in Parliament. These are not optional formalities.

Restructuring ministries without parliamentary consultation, dismissing civil servants without due process, or introducing foreign “delivery units” without statutory grounding is not merely unwise, it is unconstitutional.

The Anti-Corruption Act 2008 (as amended) also obliges public officers to act within lawful mandates. Disregarding procedure, particularly in procurement and recruitment, creates fertile ground for abuse, as the ASSL has consistently flagged.

“Shortcuts have long term consequences,” said anti-corruption activist speaking on condition of anonymity. “By bypassing law in the name of efficiency, we end up weakening accountability and fuelling impunity.”

Democracy Is Not the Problem; It Is the Solution

DOGE’s chaotic theatrics chainsaws, memes, AI driven purges, reflected the mindset of some Sierra Leonean officials who conflate popularity with virtue. However, genuine reform is slow, deliberate, and humble. It respects compromise, consultation, and institutional resilience.

The TRC cautioned against reforms that exclude the population or ignore historical grievances:

“Top-down restructuring, if unaccompanied by inclusive dialogue, creates new injustices under the guise of correction.”

http://www.sierraleonetrc.org/index.php/view-report-text-vol-3b/item/volume-three-b-chapter-two

Musk’s downfall came when courts began reversing DOGE decisions, civil servants had to be rehired, and the President had to intervene to prevent institutional collapse. Sierra Leone has faced similar setbacks, including the hasty privatisation of energy distribution in the 2010s, which was later revised due to public backlash and underperformance.

As Speaker Sam Rayburn once said of President Kennedy’s technocrats:

“I’d feel better if just one of them had run for sheriff once.”

In our case, we would feel more confident if even one technocrat had ever worked in a district office, appeared before a procurement board, or engaged local chiefs in participatory budgeting.

A Call to Action

To prevent the rise of future DOGEs in Sierra Leone, we must:

Establish a Public Service Reform Review Committee that includes representatives from the civil service, legal community, trade unions, academia, and traditional authorities, not just donors and consultants.

Strengthen the Public Service Commission by ensuring true independence and enforceable, merit based recruitment.

Make parliamentary vetting mandatory for all heads of commissions and special agencies, to prevent politically motivated appointments.

Fully implement the TRC governance reform recommendations, particularly those concerning decentralisation, legal adherence, and civic participation.

DOGE failed not because reform is impossible, but because reform without law, without history, and without democracy is bound to fail. Sierra Leone’s Constitution, the TRC legacy, and the lived experiences of our people have all been delivering the same message for decades:

True reform is not a technological solution. It is a democratic commitment.

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